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Abstract 
Most sociolegal research on juries and other forms of lay participation in criminal 
justice has been limited to questions of how lay people make decisions. This article 
proposes expanding this focus through a conceptually and methodologically novel 
examination of the recent incorporation of lay decision-makers in Argentina’s criminal 
justice system. Based on fieldwork conducted in the province of Córdoba, the article 
follows jurors as they enter the courthouses, unsettle normalized everyday practices 
and spatiotemporal arrangements, and encounter multiple authorities that define their 
role and legitimate belonging therein. The work of these multiple entities, the article 
argues, locates jurors in ambiguous situations between public and private spaces of the 
courthouses, and ultimately accentuate their alterity vis-à-vis legal professionals. 
Drawing on an ethnographic approach inspired in actor-network theory and on 
Mariana Valverde’s sociolegal elaborations of Bakhtin’s notion of chronotope, the article 
looks at this judicial reform as a site for fruitful examination of law’s multiscalar power 
dynamics, and it argues that legal institutions be investigated as flexible, fragile, and 
contingent assemblages of practices beyond their official representations. 
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Introduction 
Hugo,1 a janitor I befriended at Córdoba’s main criminal courthouse during my 
fieldwork in Argentina, was complaining about the ongoing pay struggle of 
municipality workers. According to him (and the union-loathing media he was 
referencing), their wages were an already unjustifiably high percentage of the city’s 
budget. To my reply that such percentage was even higher in the judiciary, he argued, 
“Municipalities are made of things: lamp posts, asphalt, traffic lights, parks, waste 
trucks.... The Judiciary is people, at the end of the day it is people knowing things and 
making decisions.” He concluded: “We just need paper and some printers, not much 
more”. 
This conversation on what the judiciary is made of might have seemed to Hugo a bit 
off-topic - he knew that I was interested in the incorporation of lay decision-makers 
into criminal trials. Nevertheless, his statements captured the very core of my interests 
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– law’s materiality, the times and spaces of judicial practice and authority, and how 
these are affected by the incorporation of lay participants into the assemblage of things, 
people, and practices that make up the criminal justice system.  
Although Argentina’s National Constitution has mentioned the criminal jury in three 
separate clauses since its first version in 1853, no form of lay participation was 
implemented in federal justice or in any of the provinces’ court systems until the 1980s 
(Bergoglio, 2011; Cavallero and Hendler, 1988; Hendler, 2008).2 With the return of 
constitutional rule following the last dictatorship (which lasted from 1976 to 1983), a 
process of legal and judicial reforms ensued, including profound modifications to 
federal and provincial criminal processes. Although it was not at the core of the agenda 
of international agencies or local reformers (Langer, 2007), the visibility of and 
activism for lay participation in criminal adjudication increased during this period. The 
province of Córdoba reformed its constitution in 1986, allowing the incorporation of 
lay people to the decision of judicial cases, and in 1991 passed the law enacting the 
country’s first criminal mixed tribunal.3 In 2004 the province brought into force a new 
system—a mixed tribunal of eight lay persons and three judges who together decide 
verdicts by majority rule. Jurors are summoned to take part in the decision of a single 
case (the most serious murder cases and cases of public corruption).4 
This research follows jurors into Córdoba’s criminal courthouses, and discusses how 
their incorporation into routines, spaces, and procedures unsettles taken-for-granted 
practices and boundaries. Jurors find themselves in places and schedules that were not 
imagined or designed to include them, and they encounter regular inhabitants who find 
cohabiting these time-spaces with them problematic. The conflicts that arise over 
jurors’ spatiotemporal belonging in courthouses’ everyday workings are adjudicated by 
and through human and nonhuman entities, giving place to a fragile, contingent, and 
occasionally contradictory aggregate of governance work that simultaneously grants 
lay people with markers of status yet excludes them from physical and symbolic spaces. 
My analysis finds that this network of authorities that claim some degree of jurisdiction 
(Valverde, 2009, 2014a) over jurors’ legitimate location and status leaves lay people in 
an ambiguous position between those who belong and those who are outsiders, forcing 
them to navigate between public and private spaces of courthouses in ways that 
ultimately accentuate their alterity vis-à-vis jurists. 
Methodologically, I trace this assemblage of lay decision-makers into criminal 
courthouses through an ethnographic study inspired by actor network theory (ANT) 
(Latour, 1993, 1996, 2005; see also Callon, 1986; Law, 1999). Combined with a 
conceptual framework that relies on Mariana Valverde’s sociolegal reworking of the 
Bakhtinian notion of chronotope (Valverde, 2014b, 2015), the result is an expanded 
gaze that incorporates rules, spaces, temporalities, and the people who are bound by 
them without aprioristically assigning any primacy, turning their interactions into the 
empirical question. In this sense, this article offers modest yet important proposals that 
rejuvenate methodological approaches and conceptual tools for interrogating legal 
institutions and their relationships with ordinary people. The next section discusses the 
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potential of these proposals in relation to jury and lay participation research, a 
distinctively fertile field of sociolegal research that has so far been limited in 
methodological reach and theoretical depth. The main empirical sections follow, 
focusing on the role of architectural and other material and spatiotemporal features of 
courthouses and the maneuvers of different authorities in defining jurors’ legitimate 
belonging therein. 
Expanding the Gaze: Toward a Chronotopical Understanding 
of Courthouse Governance 
Sociolegal research on lay participation has been focused on concerns over jurors’ 
decision-making processes and their outcomes. Emerging mostly from the Anglophone 
world, research has covered possible biases in jurors’ decision-making, including in 
matters of race and ethnicity (Brewer et al., 2000; Garvey et al., 2004; Kovalev, 2011; 
Sommers, 2006; Thomas, 2010); gender and sexual stereotypes (Ellison and Munro, 
2010); and political affiliation (Levine, 1983, 1992). Scholars have also looked at other 
factors that influence jurors’ decision-making, such as judges’ summaries and complex 
questions (Zander and Henderson, 1993; Thaman, 2007); and the use of “fact-law” 
distinction as a mechanism to narrow jurors’ competence (Hannaford-Agor and Hans, 
2003). Popular psychosocial approaches interested in deliberation group dynamics and 
their influence in decision-making are also examples of this trend (Hastie, 1993; Kaplan 
and Martín, 2006; Krivoshey, 1994). Following the expansion of lay participation 
across the globe over the last four decades (Hans, 2008, 2017; Park, 2010), empirical 
research on mixed tribunals—the preferred institutional form of most recent reforms—
has included the relative weight of lay participants’ contributions to final decisions 
(Rennig, 2001); jurors’ perception of procedural fairness (Machura, 2007); their 
likelihood to acquit or condemn as compared to professional judges (Bergoglio and 
Amietta, 2012); and the influence of judges’ status characteristics on group dynamics 
and trial outcomes (Ivković, 2007). 
Methodological designs have also been geared toward questions of jurors’ decision-
making. Most jury research relies on statistical studies of aggregates of decisions, 
posttrial surveys, or in-depth analyses of mock trials (Diamond and Rose, 2005). A 
relatively small number of studies on real juries have employed qualitative 
methodologies. Harold Garfinkel famously studied the activity of deliberating juries as 
a specific method of social inquiry, finding that jurors altered their commonsensical 
decision-making processes by filtering out the elements not considered as relevant to 
“the case” (Garfinkel, 1967: 104). His ethnomethodological approach has been used by 
scholars to elucidate jurors’ deployment of the idea of justice as they deliberate and 
decide cases (Maynard and Manzo, 1993). With many statutory restrictions on 
approaching lay decision-makers, only a handful of jury studies have used in-depth 
interviews with jurors. These have included questions of how and why decisions are 
made and on issues such as the gendered or racialized nature of these processes 
(Howarth, 1994; Steiner, 2002, 2003; Steiner and Argothy, 2004). 
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The centrality accorded to decisions is certainly not surprising; they are a cornerstone 
of legal research’s authorized sources, especially in common law countries that have 
produced the bulk of lay participation studies. Most importantly, the emphasis on 
decision-making reflects sociolegal scholars’ legitimate concerns with the force of law 
as excerpted over defendants (and victims), and with how and why jurors readily lend 
their “authorizing voice” to law’s violence (Sarat, 1995: 1119). My study’s most 
significant contribution to the field, and to sociolegal research more broadly, lies in a 
conceptual and methodological approach to investigating lay participation that 
destabilizes decision-making as the sole legitimate researchable matter in the field. 
Instead, I propose that lay participation be analyzed as a broader network of power-
laden processes. Methodic ethnographic observation shows that such participation is 
continuously constituted as an object of governance by myriad authorities through 
multiple instances of verisdiction (Foucault, 1978, 2014; Rose and Miller, 1992). 
Entities that range from projury activists imagining lay participation’s broad societal 
effects, to judges who decide cases with lay jurors, and the court personnel who 
accommodate them in courthouse spaces must creatively consider lay participation 
from different scalar perspectives. This turns ‘lay participation’ into a multifarious 
phenomenon best described as a series of epistemologically distinct and qualitatively 
diverse governable substances (Santos, 1987; Valverde, 2005, 2009). Such an 
understanding opens a space to interrogate and theorize law’s diverse ways of 
exercising power that may significantly expand the gaze of sociolegal studies more 
generally - both during and beyond hearings, deliberations, and decisions. 
This article focuses on the courthouse as the setting of a jurisdictional scale in the 
governance of lay participation. Examining the courthouse—conventionally deemed a 
site and continent of judicial activity—as a hybrid assemblage of things and practices 
(Latour, 2010) entails acknowledging the theoretical and empirical relevance of both 
its physical spaces and its temporal arrangements. Sociolegal studies have seen an 
uptick in debates on the governance of spaces as a result of a well-reported and 
researched trait of contemporary liberal governance: spatial designs regulate conducts  
without apparently hampering subjects’ autonomy or freedom (Delaney, 2010; Merry, 
2001; Silbey and Ewick, 2006). Even so, courthouses have yet to become a central foci 
of research within this trend; most studies investigating connections among spatial 
design, social and political phenomena, and power dynamics have looked at courtrooms 
(Hajjar, 2005; Mulcahy, 2007, 2010; Resnik et al., 2013).5 Mariana Valverde (2014a, 
2015) posed a conceptual challenge to this body of work by casting doubt both on the 
centrality of space as an isolated category in sociolegal research and on its implied 
theoretical primacy over time. She turned to literary critic and philosopher Mikhail 
Bakhtin’s term chronotope: “the intrinsic connectedness of spatial and temporal 
relationships that are artistically expressed in literature” (Bakhtin, 1981, quoted by 
Valverde, 2014a: 66–67; see also Scholz, 2003). Chronotopes, which in Bakhtin’s 
account define the specificities of literary genres, become in Valverde’s extrapolation 
a useful tool to study the enmeshment of time and space in legal settings without 
assigning more weight to one over the other. The courthouse, which we intuitively see 
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as “a place” (as we do with any building), becomes in this light a set of mutually defined 
temporal and spatial arrangements with changing configurations, and within which 
different truths and power games are played at different times. 
By decentering judicial decisions and looking closely at courthouses’ myriad 
spatiotemporalities, we can expand our gaze to practices, places, and times that “the 
Law” itself tends to avoid acknowledging as its own. In this article, this is foundational 
to appreciating the multiple ways in which jurors’ experiences of belonging and their 
roles are governed within and around legal processes. It is, more broadly, an effective 
tool in sociolegal studies’ ongoing task of challenging commonplace and expert (self-) 
representations of judicial activity (Barrera, 2012). My methodological inspiration in 
actor-network theory (ANT) is crucial to this style of analysis. ANT has become 
increasingly applied in sociolegal studies (Riles, 2001; Silbey, 2011; Valverde, 2011), 
but its most influential use in the study of law remains Bruno Latour’s ethnography of 
the French Conseil d’Etat (2010). Latour’s work puts forward the study of law as a way 
of arranging the social world rather than as a field that is produced through external 
social causes, thus rejecting canonical explanations of the operation of law—from the 
sociological determinism of Bourdieu’s field theory to Luhmann’s systems theory and 
orthodox doctrinal approaches (Latour, 2010: 256–260). Latour offers an understanding 
of law, noted by others, “as a network of people and of things in which legality is not a 
field to be studied independently, but is instead a way in which the world is assembled, 
an attribute that is attached to events, people, documents, and other objects when they 
become part of the decision-making process” (Levi and Valverde, 2008: 806). 
Thinking in terms of networks helps to open the black box of judicial reform, such as 
the incorporation of lay decision-makers to criminal justice, and to rethink what are 
normally seen as different stages (e.g., ideal design and practical implementation, 
inspiration of traditional sociolegal “gap studies”) as the actual workings of 
associations, translations, detours, and movements undertaken by actants. Their 
influence on the overall unfolding of the network cannot be taken for granted but needs 
to be discerned empirically (Latour, 2010). Importantly, this involves avoiding 
aprioristic ontological divides, including those consecrated by the modern culture–
nature divide between human and nonhuman actants, which can each be enrolled in 
governmental ends. These, Latour argues, have caused the limelight of the discipline to 
create blind spots for sociological analyses (Latour, 2005). ANT’s importance to the 
analytical strategy of this article is threefold: orientating the ethnographic study of 
dynamic processes of coetaneous production, utilization, and circulation of (legal) 
knowledge claims in governing incorporation of lay participants; highlighting the 
necessarily contingent nature of the outcomes of such processes (invisible to doctrinal 
legal approaches and overarching sociological explanations); and paying attention to 
the role of nonhuman actors therein. 
The following analysis looks at the fragile, shifting, and occasionally contradictory 
governance of accommodating jurors in the courthouses’ times and spaces. An 
ethnographic approach, understood as a conception and practice of knowledge, seeks 
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to describe and interpret a particular setting to make it intelligible to those who do not 
belong to it (Guber, 2011). Methodologically, it involves the researcher’s immersion in 
the context of study for the rigorous observation of its everyday practices in their own 
time and space (Burawoy 2010: 2). In line with other contemporary critical 
ethnographies of state institutions, however, the focus in this article does away with 
ethnography’s traditional concerns with the description of cultures and the search for 
meaning to look instead at the materialization of modern governance in specific, located 
practices (Inda 2005: 11). During six months in 2012–2013, I conducted systematic 
observation of routines and proceedings at criminal courthouses at four different sites 
of the province of Córdoba, Argentina. This included (1) trial hearings with and without 
lay participants and (2) courthouse routines, in both in public (i.e., corridors, halls, 
cafeterias, and court counters) and private spaces (i.e., court’s offices, waiting and 
deliberation rooms); and during, before, and after working hours. The fieldwork also 
included close reading of relevant documents (i.e., case files, decisions, legislation, and 
transcripts of constitutional and legislative debates); and interviews with individuals 
who served as jurors (n = 33), judicial officials, including judges, prosecutors, clerks, 
and assistant clerks (n = 18); lawyers (n = 6); and projury activists and reformers 
(n = 5). Additional interviews and archival research were conducted in short visits to 
Buenos Aires and La Plata. Access and recruitment were greatly facilitated by previous 
professional and research contacts. 
The research project and procedures for selection and recruitment for participants and 
for my observations at courthouses were approved by the University of Manchester 
Research Ethics Committee, and were conducted in accordance with the agreed ethical 
protocol.6 I obtained informed consent from all interview participants. Although 
criminal trial hearings are public in Córdoba, I sought permission to observe hearings 
from presiding judges; informed parties of the nature of my role and the reason for my 
presence; and handed summary information letters to individuals involved whenever 
possible, including jurors, clerks, and police officers. I also informed parties that I 
would not conduct any observation if they objected to it, although this was never the 
case. Permission to conduct observation in public and certain private spaces of 
courthouses was, as is often the case in institutional ethnographic research, a dynamic 
and ongoing process. Informal conversations and other interactions in the courthouse 
were used for this research only after consent from the participants was obtained via 
summary information letters. 
These and other ethical intricacies of ethnography’s naturalistic approach to the study 
of social phenomena, most of which stem from the critique to the inappropriateness of 
standards emerging from biomedical research, have been the subject of abundant 
literature (Fassin 2006; Fine 1993; Mapedzahama and Dune 2017). In institutional 
contexts (e.g., courthouses), notions of access and consent can only be understood as a 
dynamic process with precarious and always provisional results (Plankey-Videla, 2012: 
19). The researcher builds rapport with a wide range of individuals, traversing both 
sides of the now classical debate on “studying up” rather than “studying down” 
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(Gusterson 1997; Nader 1972). During my time at the courthouse, I interacted with the 
rules and authorities regulating my own access to different locations (which, as the 
article argues, can never be fully taken-for-granted). This entailed building rapport with 
top criminal lawyers; young interns; janitors; jurors; clerks; senior judges; relatives of 
defendants and victims of crimes; and other courthouse dwellers, objects, and spaces. 
This unfolded in all manners of relative and mutable power equations in which I was in 
control as the researcher, working with those with and without class, gender, or status 
privileges. Throughout the process, I strived to remain open and honest (periodically 
reminding my interlocutors about my position and aims as a researcher), mindful of 
contextual power imbalances, and reflective of my situation and status. 
From Alterity to Ambiguity: Jurors and Courthouse 
Spatiotemporal Governance 
In three of the four districts of Córdoba’s courts system where my fieldwork took place, 
the criminal justice functions in purpose-built venues constructed over the last twenty 
years. This relatively robust situation, as far as estates are concerned, is part and parcel 
of the judicial “renovation” that has taken place in the province since the 1980s. One of 
my interlocutors described this renovation as consisting of “two tracks,” meaning the 
legal edifice (in which reforms to criminal justice procedures played a crucial role) and 
the physical edifice (that is, courthouses). In the words of this interlocutor, these were 
“the aesthetic side of the reform,” championed mainly by the late Roberto Loustau 
Bidaut, chief justice of Córdoba’s Superior Tribunal of Justice (TSJ) from 1983 to 1995. 
The flagship building is the Palacio de Justicia II (usually called Tribunales II, and the 
term used hereafter). Tribunales II hosts the criminal justice system of the primera 
circunscripción (first judicial district), roughly covering the Capital City and its 
suburban areas and nearby smaller cities and towns, and serving about half of the 
province’s population. Designed in 1993 and opened in 1998, its contemporary 
architectural style contrasts with the neoclassical Palacio de Justicia I, which was built 
in 1936. The latter is a centrally located building that houses the Civil and Commercial 
courts and some of the Labor Law courts, as well as the TSJ, a library, an archive, and 
several administrative offices. Tribunales II is located about one mile from the City 
Centre, in the Güemes neighborhood, and is the core of a bigger architectural project 
called the Polo Judicial (Judicial Pole), which in the future will concentrate the 
Domestic Violence courts, the Investigating Police and the Labor Law courts in a single 
location.7 Tribunales II has two wings, one of which is reserved for eleven trial courts; 
the trial prosecutors’ offices (there is one prosecutor per trial court, who is always 
situated immediately opposite the corresponding court); and the Cámara de Acusación 
(Court of Appeals). The other wing, whose corridors are normally more crowded by 
lawyers and members of the public, holds the investigating prosecutors and public 
defense offices. The alcaidía,8 library, archive, and other administrative offices are 
located in the basement. 
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Calling Tribunales II a flagship is a double entendre as its design is meant to evoke the 
bow of a ship, symbolizing a modern and forward-looking justice service (see Figure 
1).9 The anchoring to the past, however, remains a strong signifier in some of its 
features. Guidelines in the contest for its design included that it could not exceed the 
four stories of the original Tribunales I, as a sign of deference (despite the original site 
being more than a half-mile away). Also, the name of the courthouse is inscribed on the 
contemporary building as Palacio de Jvsticia II, presumably to honor the Roman roots 
of the Argentine legal system and as a nod to an illustrious distant past that court 
bureaucrats periodically exalt.10 Temporal references are thus not absent from the 
conception, design and aesthetic details of this physical place. Past and future coexist—
in both cases through ahistorical, timeless references to time—while the absence of the 
present, from which the law seems to conveniently detach itself, remains conspicuous.  
 
 
Figure 1. Tribunales II. 
When jurors are not around, the inner workings of Tribunales II seem to adjudicate 
matters of space and time in relatively unproblematic ways. This is, to a large extent, 
related to the precise design of the building’s interior spaces, built with three nuclei of 
horizontal and vertical circulation: one for judges and other officials, one for the public, 
and one for prisoners. This disciplinary machinery coordinates circulation flows, 
accesses, visibilities, and invisibilities seemingly successfully. Joined with the temporal 
dimension that defines the uses and meanings of the spaces, clear lines are drawn 
between those who should and should not be in a place at a specific moment. This is of 
course not to say that practices always match the rules governing spaces. Many lawyers 
and trial prosecutors, for instance, circulate through private spaces of courthouses, 
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despite being formally identified as outsiders to them. Still, persons circulating through 
in inhabiting sections of the building have clear information or indications as to whether 
they can or cannot be in each space at a given time. 
It is appropriate here to bring jurors into the picture and ask whether the architectural 
design reflects a conception of the courthouse that involves the presence and activity of 
lay decision makers. The answer, put simply, is no. Córdoba’s courthouses are imagined 
for a judicial chronotope (Valverde, 2015) that does not include lay participants as part 
of official proceedings, places, and schedules—even in recently built venues that 
belong to the era of lay participation in the province’s criminal justice. In this context, 
the situation of jurors within the spatiotemporal arrangements and normalized everyday 
workings of the courthouse can be best described as ambiguous, creating tensions and 
conflicts for their accommodation. These conflicts are adjudicated by the action of 
myriad human and nonhuman actants, from janitors to material status markers, which 
define jurors’ access to and role within courthouse spaces and times. The incorporation 
of jurors tends to be more complicated in the informal physical and symbolic spaces 
(i.e., corridors, waiting rooms, toilets, cafeterias, recesses within hearings, and 
moments of socialization) than in formal ones (i.e., trial hearings and deliberations). 
This article’s stretching of the judicial space’s spatiotemporal researchable matter 
beyond traditional sites (such as courtrooms) is thus relevant and revealing. 
Let me resort to my observations from Tribunales II in Córdoba’s Capital City to 
illustrate these points, starting with the site and time of judicial authority par excellence: 
the courtroom during trial hearings. In the building, only the courtroom of the Cámara 
de Acusación (Court of Appeals), more spacious than those of the trial courts, has been 
especially furnished to fit the panel of eight (plus four substitutes) lay participants 
(Figure 2). Mixed tribunal trials, however, are always held in the smaller hearing rooms 
of each court. Ad hoc sitting arrangements must be made when jurors are included—
some clerks even ignore the existence of the properly furnished courtroom at the Court 
of Appeals. Accommodating jurors in hearings is not perceived as an important matter 
by court officials and judges, thus necessary arrangements are decided by assistant 
clerks or even janitors.11 Their decisions usually remain undisputed, but occasionally 
conflicts arise. This means that minutes before a courtroom becomes the theatre for a 
criminal trial, with all the knowledge and power effects conventionally attached to it, 
they host very different truth games, with significant jurisdictional claims made and 
pitted against each other to define no less than the legitimate location of the lay 
decision-makers. In one of the trials I observed, for example, the janitor had positioned 
eight chairs for jurors in front of the elevated platform where the judges were to sit, 
leaving no room for the substitute jurors (only three in this case), who he placed in the 
first row with the spectators. A member of the Juries Office, which oversees 
administrative issues related to lay participation, checked this courtroom before the 
hearing and disliked this arrangement, finding it unacceptable that the substitutes were 
among the audience. He went into the court offices, came back with the janitor, and, 
after a short discussion that included arguments on jurors’ status and integrity, he made 
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the janitor relocate all the jurors to two parallel rows of six chairs near the defense 
lawyers and defendants, and perpendicular to them – an “American movie jury pattern” 
that, perhaps due to these popular culture influences, is the most common arrangement 
in the trials at Tribunales II. 
 
 
Figure 2. Court of Appeals, Hearing Room. The three seats in the center of the podium are for judges and the 
remaining ones for jurors. 
In smaller sites outside the Capital City, spanning ten criminal courts in nine judicial 
districts, the situation is compounded by acute temporo-spatial constrains. A single set 
of furniture travels across the province to accommodate jurors in the courtrooms. This 
means that the Juries Office must orchestrate the scheduling of mixed tribunals to avoid 
concurrent trials in different sites; a clerk creates the schedules and authorizes via phone 
calls which courts may proceed with setting dates for trials. If an overlap occurs, one 
of the courts will have to improvise with furniture. The starkest contrast with the space 
afforded courtrooms in the Capital City, as far as I could observe, was in the criminal 
court in the town of Tardecita, where the court’s hearing room—located in a rented 
building opposite the main square—is too small even to accommodate the nomadic 
furniture set. Instead, the first two rows of audience seats are reserved for jurors. The 
lack of proper spatial resources creates inconvenience and prompts complaints, and the 
unfulfilled promises of improved conditions were regularly brought up in my 
conversations with court staff. These conditions, however, also elicit creative practices 
that are relevant to my argument. Alicia, an experienced assistant clerk in Tardecita’s 
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court, told me of a trial with jurors that was expected to attract strong public attention, 
triggering her concerns over accommodation in what is an already undersized 
courtroom. Alicia considered asking municipal authorities to make the local theatre 
available for the trial, but town officials argued that too many seats would remain 
empty. She took her idea further and invited secondary schools in the area to bring 
students to observe the trial and then she helped teachers prepare special coursework 
on the experience. 
With scarce resources, creative practices such as this convey not only the claim to 
competently decide law’s place (a form of jurisdiction) but also the preferred meaning 
of “participation” in this particular legal setting. It is certainly an expanded meaning 
when compared to the one limited to the more or less autonomous intervention in the 
delivery of a verdict that marks the epistemologically limited conception held equally 
by most legal experts, judicial officials, reformers, activists, and sociolegal scholars. 
Beyond this (somewhat) normative evaluation, and to avoid overromanticizing the 
episode with Alicia, the most relevant theoretical points of this illustration are the 
flexible, fragile, and highly contingent relations among time, space, law, and meanings 
of participation. Central to the outcome in Tardecita was Alicia’s successful translation 
work and enrollment of people and things, from municipal authorities and school 
students to limited spatial resources, and her own accumulated legal knowledge. 
Perhaps most importantly, these decisions, just like the ones of the janitor and clerk in 
the previous vignette, were made by authorities with no formal entitlement or legal 
power to adjudicate these matters. 
Cohabiting Law’s Everyday 
The complications jurors pose to the assumed normality of courthouse 
spatiotemporalities are not limited to the courtrooms during hearings. Their arrival has 
entailed adjustments to the configuration of taken-for-granted times and spaces of the 
courthouse’s everyday activities. Some adjustments have proved thornier than others 
for court personnel. Conflicts over jurors’ status and legitimate location and belonging 
can be traced in multiple daily mundane matters and in formal and informal 
spatiotemporal dimensions. I will illustrate this argument through three examples of my 
fieldwork observation: the use of name badges that facilitate jurors’ access to the 
courthouse; their incorporation in a symbolic time-place-practice of the courts (i.e., 
breakfast); and jurors’ use of the courts’ private toilets. 
The security located at the entrance of Tribunales II epitomizes jurors’ transition from 
full alterity to an ambiguous mix of outsider and authorized status. Police are located at 
the extreme left of a thirty-foot-wide main entrance leading to the three-story-high 
central foyer. Relatives of defendants in trials, clients of public defense lawyers, and 
people summoned as witnesses are the regular subjects for routine security checks. 
Judicial officials, clerks, and employees who choose not to use their own segregated 
entrance—plus other known regulars of the building such as lawyers, journalists, 
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waiters, and vendors—are allowed to bypass security out of convenience. When jurors 
first come to the courthouse, they are treated as any other first-time visitor. They go to 
security, have their names and reasons for their visit recorded, and walk through the 
metal detector. At their first contact with the Juries Office, jurors are given name badges 
that certify their status for the duration of the trial and allow them to use the officials’ 
entrance. If they prefer to continue to use the main access, the badges spare them the 
security check. In smaller sites, where security controls are less developed, other 
prerogatives are conceded to jurors, like parking spaces in judges’ car parks. Although 
mostly symbolic, these instances of law’s power and embodied materiality are crucial 
to the definition of jurors’ status during their temporary stay in courthouse spaces. 
Conventional representations of judicial authority are destabilized in this work to look 
beyond jurors’ embodiment in decisions of trials; their unique standing is also 
channelled in the courthouse everyday workings through material markers of status and 
signs of differentiation and spatiotemporal belonging. A name badge that facilitates 
access, allows skipping security and softens the police gaze on an outsider, widens 
spaces and times of legitimate permanence. 
In interviews and conversations, several jurors mentioned these status markers as 
central elements in their generally positive evaluations of the experience. One early 
morning I met Patricia, a juror in the case I had been observing for a few days. She was 
sitting in the foyer of the still-nearly empty building, knitting as she observed the first 
movements of people. She explained to me that she used the taxis provided by the Juries 
Office to first drop her children at school and then come to the court directly afterward, 
the downside to it being a long wait, as she was summoned only for 9 a.m. That morning 
I had gone through security—something I would occasionally choose to do during my 
fieldwork, despite looking like and mostly being treated as an “insider.” Patricia saw 
me coming from the police post, and her first remark was related to her status regarding 
security control. She told me that the first day she arrived in the courthouse she had 
gone through the strict control (which she was spared now thanks to her juror badge), 
and wondered what would have happened had she brought her knitting that day. She 
had not, and she ended up incredibly bored during the wait. She also wondered whether 
other people without juror badges would get away with bringing in metallic knitting 
needles. In any case, she concluded, she felt more comfortable in this public foyer being 
observed by police officers than in the court of her case under the gaze of the young 
female assistant clerks—“snots”—who, she felt, were not at ease with her arriving so 
early. 
As Patricia’s closing remarks suggest, jurors do not automatically belong to every 
courthouse space and time by virtue of their status or the material indicators that 
differentiate them from regular outsiders. In informal times and spaces, where the 
disciplining and categorizing tools of the law are less available to justify decisions, 
accommodating jurors makes court staff especially uneasy. When a mixed tribunal trial 
is scheduled, jurors are usually summoned to arrive at 8:30 or 9 a.m., although trials 
seldom start before 10 in the morning.12 It is common to hear complaints about the 
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waiting time, but for most jurors this is not as problematic as it may seem. They rapidly 
get used to the idea of devoting an entire work day to this activity and adopt a resigned 
attitude to the fact that hearings never start on time.13 
A consequence of the lag is that jurors need to be put somewhere during this waiting 
time; but without a dedicated space for them, this becomes a matter of case-by-case 
adjudication. In some courts, jurors must wait in the public corridors, usually until 
relatives of defendants and victims arrive for the trial. Yet the most common practice 
is that early-bird jurors are allowed into the private spaces of courts’ offices, which are 
filling with clerks, officials, and other court workers. This means not only sharing a 
place but also a widely held practice in Córdoba’s criminal courts: breakfast. A truly 
chronotopical concoction of time, space, and practices, breakfast at the courthouse is, 
for court staff, a heavily symbolic space of temporarily diluted hierarchies. There is 
time for informal chats to recap workplace issues or the news of the day before the 
morning’s rush. As mundane as this may seem, breakfast at the courts is a chance to 
observe how uneasy this sharing can be for court officials. On one occasion when I was 
at breakfast with a group of assistant clerks and clerks,14 jurors were waiting in the Sala 
de Acuerdos—a room where judges deliberate trials. This room is furnished only with 
a hexagonal table, three armchairs (one for each of the courts’ judges) and one or two 
bookshelves. As a waiter from the courthouse cafeteria entered carrying a tray of coffee 
and pastries, a judge who was just arriving asked where the food was being delivered. 
Hearing it was the jurors’ breakfast, he commented sarcastically to me: “I want to apply 
for a position as a juror. Do you know where I can do that?” Some cross-talk followed 
among the assistant clerks. They concluded that the jurors had placed the order 
themselves instead of waiting for a court clerk or Juries Office assistant clerk to do it 
for them. The discussion then moved to payment. Jurors’ breakfasts are paid by the 
Juries Office from their budget for jurors’ allowances, which also includes jurors’ 
transportation and daily payment. At this point, an assistant clerk addressed me directly 
to make a point: court staff have to pay for breakfast; jurors, who get paid for their work 
at the courthouse, should also pay for their food. “The state is paying for them, and the 
state is all of us,” she said, and added that she prefers to order jurors’ breakfasts herself 
when she is in charge of a case to “keep some control.” Minor money expenditures and 
keeping and reasserting some sort of control over familiar spaces remain critical to the 
adjudication of the mundane tensions that jurors’ belonging creates at the intersection 
of the “public” and the “private” at the courthouse. 
One more example of the governance of another courthouse space can illustrate further 
the complex public-private spatiotemporal dyad, its many dimensions, and its role in 
the puzzle of jurors’ belonging and status. When I asked a group of assistant clerks 
about the most problematic issue the incorporation of jurors had brought (expecting to 
excerpt some debate about sharing the power to judge and punish, or to hear their 
preoccupation for defendants’ rights in the face of commonsensical punitiveness), they 
did not hesitate: their main concern lay with the use of the court’s private toilets. 
Assistant clerks, clerks, and officials, they told me, periodically collect money among 
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themselves for toilet paper and cleaning products, which are not provided by the 
judiciary; and they pay a little extra to maintenance staff who keep them clean. After a 
few trials with jurors, they had detected “overuse” of the toilet paper supply and 
deficiencies in hygiene maintenance. They decided that jurors could no longer use this 
toilet and would instead be asked to use the public toilets located in courthouse 
corridors. 
The breakfasts—paid for by workers’ themselves yet publicly funded for jurors—left 
courthouse bureaucrats frustrated and justifying their attempts at control over some 
diffuse protection of taxpayers’ money. On the other hand, the “doubly private” nature 
of the courts’ toilets (privately funded and spatiotemporally private) left, in their view, 
no doubt as to their spatial-control jurisdiction, and to jurors’ subjection to it. The 
demotion of jurors to the status of “general public,” at least with the use of this specific 
space, is not simply a matter of convenience. These mundane decisions on the 
belonging of jurors become part of the network of the incorporation of lay participation 
and have repercussions when coupled with the courts’ fragile assemblage of routine 
practices. My last ethnographic vignette will help explain this.  
The setting is the final hearing in a murder trial in which five men are accused of killing 
a moneylender. It is Friday at noon and the end of a week of hearings filled with 
witnesses’ declarations laying bare the deficiencies in the police investigation. It was 
clear that the defendants would be acquitted. With only the closings of the prosecution 
and defense pending, a short recess is called. In the corridor, the defense lawyers and 
prosecutor chat animatedly, in stark contrast to the tense recesses during the week. The 
mood changed when one of the jurors appeared. On his way to the public toilets, the 
juror effusively congratulates the defense lawyers, clapping the youngest on his back, 
saying: “Well done, Doctors.” 
The lawyer reacts: “No, no, you can’t say that, please.” After the juror leaves and the 
ensuing moment of awkward silence, he says to me: “They don’t know, they have no 
idea, they should be told about this kind of thing.”  
The remaining few minutes of the recess are devoted to a serious discussion among the 
all-law-educated party. I seem to be the only one who considered the “misconduct” of 
the juror insignificant, especially after months of observing officials and lawyers 
periodically stretching legal rules and conveniently breaching the formalities of 
proceedings. In the view of the legal professionals involved, endowed with the 
necessary intellectual capital and training in the deployment of postures and 
performances of objectivity (Bourdieu, 1987, 2003), this outsider was misinformed 
about the formalities of the law, especially venerable as they relate to the impartiality 
of an adjudicator.15 What is relevant to my argument in this article is that it is the very 
materiality of the juror’s presence and conduct that rendered the naturalized workings 
of this rule visible in this particular time and space. The need for the juror to travel 
through this public space at that crucial time was opened by the decision as to which 
private spaces these ambiguous characters are entitled to and from which they are 
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excluded. The accentuation of the jurors’ alterity vis-à-vis legal professionals and their 
modes of conduct can be understood, in turn, as both an effect and a constitutive part 
of the very demarcation of jurors’ legitimate spatiotemporal belonging. 
Concluding Remarks: The Law and Its Spatiotemporal 
Boundaries 
While I was immersed in observing courthouse routines, I was also analyzing a 
completely different scale of the governance (Valverde, 2014b) of the introduction of 
lay participation: reading jury trial bills and legislative debates, and interviewing 
projury activists in several Argentine cities. From across the political spectrum, these 
reformers mobilized different, even contradictory, political rationalities; and they 
expected lay participation to produce a broad range of societal effects, from 
democratization of the judiciary to its legitimation and to harsher punishments 
(Amietta, 2016). They did, however, all seem to agree on one point: the potential of lay 
participation to bring commonsensical understandings of law and justice to the realm 
of overly technical and bureaucratized truth-seeking processes of the criminal justice 
system. This is a claim shared by conventional and scholarly wisdom on lay 
participation (Dzur, 2012; Finkel, 2001). Elsewhere I have challenged this view (and 
the very divide between the “everyday” realm and the sphere of Law [capital L] that it 
implies) and argued that jurors’ arrival to Argentine criminal proceedings entailed 
instead the incorporation of new elements to an already contingent and mutable balance 
of formal and informal, and even legal and illegal, practices that make up judicial 
proceedings (Amietta, 2019). 
My analysis of jurors’ incorporation to the multiple spatiotemporal dimensions of 
courthouses adds an extra layer of conceptual and empirical substance to these 
discussions. The use of the notion of jurisdiction in a critical vein implies not limiting 
oneself to the “natural” move from a bigger to a smaller scale of governance, but to take 
seriously the qualitatively different nature of the interventions of multiple authorities 
as the network is knitted together (Valverde, 2009, 2010, 2015). Such differences relate 
to the kind of priorities they put forth, the objects they make visible and those they 
conceal, and the temporalities (historical and nonhistorical) and spatialities they have 
in mind (Santos, 1987). The myriad authorities that regulate jurors’ everyday 
assemblage to the courthouses do, I claim, exercise forms of jurisdiction and of 
verisdiction (Foucault, 2014) that simply target a qualitatively different governable 
object than those of authorities looking at this phenomenon of participation through a 
broader scale. This includes the macro-social scale of reformers who advocate for 
introducing lay participation as a device to seismically transform, democratize, and/or 
legitimize the judiciary and its way of judging and punishing. When it reaches the 
courthouses, as discussed in this article, lay participation simply becomes a 
qualitatively different governable object—one governed with different audiences, 
spatial and temporal frameworks, values, aims, and understandings of participation in 
mind. My first point thus relates to law’s multiscalar operation. The plurality of legal 
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governance and the inadequacy between these scales is, importantly, not an obstacle. 
Quite the opposite. A point that conventional sociolegal “gap studies” miss is that law’s 
scalar complexity actually guarantees its smooth operation on the condition that it is 
presented as “already itself governed” through the invisible operation of jurisdiction 
(Valverde, 2009: 141). 
A methodological strategy that allowed me to sidestep accepted divides to observe these 
multiple scales at work emerged after conceiving of the courthouse as a hybrid; that is, 
an inherently unstable network that is the aftereffect of certain associations of ideas, 
persons, and things being set in motion (Latour, 1993). The systematic observation of 
courthouse routines and informal interactions among courthouse inhabitants laid bare 
how practices toward the governance of lay participation traverse and void the well-
established public-private and spatial-temporal dyads, and materially and symbolically 
force jurors to navigate between them. The analysis showed that, far from rigidly 
determining the possible conducts, belongings, and hierarchies of the different actors 
within it, courthouse spaces are defined and redefined on different temporal scales and 
through multifarious practices as jurors are accommodated. As such, I suggest this 
matter may be fruitfully studied as complex spatiotemporal arrangements best captured 
by the notion of chronotope (Valverde, 2014b, 2015). This chronotopical approach—
the adjectival form is purposefully here used to avoid any claim that there is such a 
thing, ontologically existing, as the judicial chronotope—highlighted the flexible 
relationship among authority, status, and meanings of participation and the ambiguous 
location of jurors in the courthouses’ places and times. Rendering the work of multiple 
authorities visible has allowed me to connect their jurisdictional work with its effects 
in terms of everyday practices. I have previously claimed that this ambiguity works 
toward producing and reproducing jurors’ constitution as outsiders and law’s “others” 
when their spatiotemporal dislocation and inadequacy to the written or unwritten rules 
of courthouses is called out by legal professionals, in contrast to the normalization of 
the breaches to proceedings when they come from jurists themselves (Amietta, 2019). 
The study of the multiscalar operation of a sociolegal hybrid and observation of jurors’ 
incorporation therein also allowed me to document law’s own awkwardness with its 
ambiguous and contingent materiality. Just as Tribunales II contains signs of respect 
for the past and promises of a better future, it detaches law’s working from the present. 
I observed how the law tries to externalize spaces and times that are hard to 
acknowledge as their own. Yet I also saw how legal or quasi-legal truth claims continue 
to be involved in the spatiotemporal governance of mundane instances, such as related 
to breakfasts, corridors, waiting spaces, and toilets. This is despite these not being 
regarded as events or spaces of judicial practice and authority and left to the governance 
of barely visible authorities, even when they stretch the justice’s spatiotemporal limits 
and force it to occupy unexpected spaces (like a small-town municipal theatre), or travel 
from one site to another in the form of an itinerant set of furniture. Law is pluri-scalar, 
but also pluri-spatial and multi-temporal, and much of this material plurality (which is 
fragile and contingent because it is made of practices that are governed by multiple 
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authorities) will not be part of law’s official story of its welcoming, and defining the 
belonging of, laypersons to criminal justice proceedings. But just as law’s multiscalar 
materiality escapes doctrinal approaches, so too its powerful effects on contingent 
configurations remain invisible to sociolegal studies that focus only on legitimate 
researchable spaces such as judicial decisions or seek macro-social sociological 
explanations. This article suggests instead that scholars creatively incorporate more of 
these scales in lay participation and sociolegal research more broadly. 
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1 All names of individuals and of sites other than the Capital City are pseudonyms. 
2 Article 24: “The Congress shall promote (…) the establishment of jury trial.” Article 75, 
Section 12: “The Congress shall (…) enact [the general laws] which the establishment of the 
trial by jury may require.” Article 118: The trial of all ordinary criminal cases (…) shall be 
decided by jury (…) once this institution is established in the Republic.” These provisions were 
maintained in nearly every reform of the Constitution (1860, 1866, 1898, 1957, 1972, and 1994) 
except in 1949, during the government of Juan Domingo Perón. 
3 Law 8123, Art. 369, establishing a nonmandatory mixed tribunal formed by three professional 
judges and two escabinos (laypersons) for the judgment of crimes with potential prison 
sentences of over fifteen years. The outcomes of this first experience were quantitatively very 
limited, and only thirty-three cases were judged with escabinos from 1998 to 2004 (Vilanova, 
2004).  
4 Law 9182. One of the judges presides over the debate and votes only in case of a tie, and 
judges alone sentence (Law 9182, Arts. 4, 18, 29, 37, 41, 43 and 44). Although their 
competences largely overlap, this system virtually coexists with the 1991 escabinos, which was 
not abolished (Ferrer and Grundy 2005). For a series of analysis of the implementation of lay 
participation in Córdoba from socio-legal perspectives, see the volumes edited by Bergoglio 
(2010) and Bergoglio et al (2019). Following Córdoba’s experience, Neuquén (Law No. 2784, 
2011), Buenos Aires (Law No 14543, 2013), R´ıo Negro (Law No 5020, 2017) and Mendoza 
(Law No 9016, 2018) have implemented jury trials following the common law model. Chubut’s 
(Law No 5478, 2006), Chaco’s (Law 7661, 2015), and San Juan’s (Law No 1851, 2018) systems 
have been passed but not yet implemented. Legislative projects have also been presented to the 
National Congress and to the legislatures of other provinces, including La Rioja, Salta and Santa 
Fe. 
5 For collections of essays summarizing current concerns of legal and sociolegal approaches 
with human and critical geography (largely in critical legal studies), see Sarat et al. (2006) and 
Braverman et al. (2014). For a seminal study in the interdisciplinary exploration of this link, 
see Blomley (1994). 
6 Project reference 12218. 
7 Revista de Arquitectura SCA (1999), no. 193. 
8 A small police dependency that hosts defendants brought from prisons for their trials or 
identification parades. 
9 The author holds the copyright for all photographs. Permission to photograph hearing rooms 
was obtained, and photos were taken outside of hearing hours. 
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10 “That is how justicia is written in Latin” was the most common answer I received when I 
spent a morning outside the building to inquire passers-by on the lettering. 
11 Each court has an exclusively appointed ordenanza, a janitor, who not only cleans and 
maintains the courtroom but is also in charge of tasks crucial for the operation of the courthouse, 
such as delivering files and other documents that circulate between different offices within the 
judiciary and public or private entities. Mapping their role and enormous influence in the 
workings of the courthouse would be a fascinating endeavor, but it exceeds the limits of this 
article. 
12 It is important to note that, although the law establishes the possibility of sequestering jurors 
if considered necessary, this has not been done. In practice, jurors go home every day.  
13 Waiting times and spaces at courthouses and other legal venues is a topic that deserves further 
elaboration but exceeds the scope of this work. For an analysis of the acts of waiting on 
individuals subordinated to Argentina's state bureaucratic agencies, see Auyero (2012), who 
argues that forceful waiting works systematically as a form of subjection to the state of the 
least-endowed citizens. Although my observations show a much more nuanced picture in which 
officials and bureaucrats are equally upset and frustrated with their inability to control waiting 
times, it is interesting to note that jurors’ attitudes toward waiting times reinforce their 
ambiguous status—a mix of empowerment, alterity, and subjection. 
14 My own ambiguous status in this particular context and in courthouses in general during my 
fieldwork deserves further elaboration. My condition as a law-educated temporary guest 
(invited and not imposed), I believe, may have made my presence more palatable to court staff. 
15 See Latour (2005, Chapter 5) for a different account of lawyers’ performances of objectivity, 
and an interesting comparison to that of scientists. 
